Virtual money, virtual control?: electronic money, electronic cash and governance by Lovett, Kathleen S
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations 
1-1-2003 
Virtual money, virtual control?: electronic money, electronic cash 
and governance 
Kathleen S. Lovett 
Iowa State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd 
Recommended Citation 
Lovett, Kathleen S., "Virtual money, virtual control?: electronic money, electronic cash and governance" 
(2003). Retrospective Theses and Dissertations. 19484. 
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/19484 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and 
Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses 
and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, 
please contact digirep@iastate.edu. 
Virtual money, virtual control? 
Electronic money, electronic cash and governance 
by 
Kathleen S. Lovett 
A thesis submitted to the graduate faculty 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degrees of 
MASTER OF ARTS 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
Co-majors: Political Science; Information Assurance 
Program of Study Committee: 
Matthias Kaelberer, Co-major Professor 
James Davis, Co-major Professor 
Barbara Licklider 
Steffen Schmidt 
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 
2003 
Copyright© Kathleen S. Lovett, 2003. All rights reserved. 
Graduate College 
Iowa State University 
This is to certify that the master's thesis of 
Kathleen S. Lovett 
has met the thesis requirements of Iowa State University 
Signatures have been redacted for privacy 
11 
111 
Table of Contents 
Chapter One: Introduction 1 
Chapter Two: The Evolution of Money 4 
Chapter Three: Money, Electronic Money and Governance 24 
Chapter Four: The Future of Money? 39 
Chapter Five: Conclusions 58 
Bibliography 60 
Chapter One: Introduction 
The inestimable Gertrude Stein once asked, "is money money, or isn't money 
money?"1 As is often the case with humor writers, there is more to her question than meets 
the eye during a cursory inspection. After all, every citizen of a modem society knows what 
money is - or do we? What does money look like? What does it feel like? Who issues 
money? Who owns it? Who controls it - are they the same people as those who issue it? 
Who ultimately governs and controls money? When we begin to answer some of these 
questions for ourselves, the answers help us understand just how complicated money and the 
monetary system are, and how important both are to define and to understand. Over time, 
political scientists, bankers, and economists (among many others) have answered and re-
answered these questions for themselves in the context of W estem economies. Although 
there have been changes in monetary systems, there has been some general consensus 
developed about the nature of money, physical or otherwise. After all, "whether you like it 
or whether you do not, money is money and that is all there is about it. "2 
1 
Over the last several decades, economists, political scientists and bankers have had to 
struggle with some new questions: how have developing information and communications 
technologies affected the answers to the questions once thought solved? How do electronic 
money and other media affect the overall monetary system and who ultimately governs 
money? Indeed, what will money look like in the future? Will there continue to be a role 
for the central banks that have formed the backbone to the monetary system for so long? To 
1 Gertrude Stein, Saturday Evening Post, (July 13, 1936), quoted Zelizer 1994 
2 Ibid. 
answer these questions, I must first build a definition of money that shows how electronic 
forms of money fit together with its predecessors, which I will do in the second chapter. I 
will also show how electronic moneys fit into the context of the current monetary landscape. 
In the third chapter, I will discuss several of the issues raised by politicians and 
economists about the future connection between governments and money, including a focus 
on the efficacy of central bank decisions and policy making in this era of information 
technology and electronic money. I will also include some of the other predictions by 
political scientists, economists and others regarding the future of the monetary landscape. I 
will next discuss some of the increasing trends of globalization in the monetary sector, and a 
possible change in the composition of the governing bodies involved in monetary policy. I 
will include a discussion of the roles of two of the major institutions in the international 
sector, as well as suggest some other possible influencing factors or institutions. 
In the fourth chapter, I will review the major forms of developing electronic money: 
e-cash and Stored Value Systems. These forms of money have not yet been fully integrated 
into the monetary and payment systems, and there are a number of issues associated with 
them that must be addressed before full integration is achieved. In this chapter, I will look 
both at the possible applications of Stored Value Systems as well as the underlying protocols 
and the particular implications they might have for the nature of the monetary system. 
In the fifth and final chapter, I will draw some conclusions from my research. I will 
focus my conclusions on answering the questions I introduced this section with: to what 
degree will monetary governance change, and what the composition of the monetary and 
payments system will most likely look like. 
2 
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Chapter Two: The Evolution of Money 
Modern Americans seem to have few questions about the value of their money. If 
they have a ten-dollar bill, they have a bill worth ten dollars - a comparison that (nearly) any 
American would understand. Barring alien invasion or massive dollar devaluations, the 
owner of the bill can take the ten-dollar bill they have and use it to purchase groceries or use 
it to pay the neighbor kid for mowing the lawn. They can also deposit that ten-dollar bill in 
a bank account where it would accrue interest, or stick it in the sock drawer to use later. 
These actions all fulfill specific criteria of what it means for something to be "money." 
However, Americans rarely step back and ask from where that ten-dollar bill derives its ten 
dollars of value. What about checks? Is a check for ten dollars worth the same as a ten-
dollar bill? What about a ten dollar credit card payment, is it worth the same as the bill? 
What about five pounds of two dollars-a-pound gummi bears? Are they all worth the same 
thing? In this chapter, I will offer a definition for money: what gives money its worth, 
where it derives its worth, and what makes a dollar a dollar - and different from a Japanese 
yen or a bag of gummi bears. Because money is so often associated with governments, this 
will eventually allow me to draw a connection between governments and the value and 
control of money. 
Money is essential to trade and to most forms of human economic interaction. 
Therefore, it is important to understand the implications of how money is organized in the 
broader economic system. However, like of much of society, the monetary system has 
undergone remarkable changes over its lifetime, and to understand how money has changed, 
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one must be able to trace and measure those changes. I am most interested in examining 
those changes that effect how money fulfills its most basic functions, including whether 
money's physical form influences that ability. General definitions of money focus on three 
broad tests of functionality: whether the money can be used as a general unit of exchange, 
whether it is able to be used as a store of value, and whether the particular money can be used 
as a unit of account (Cohen 1998, 10). 
There are two different schools of thought on how one should conceptualize and 
organize money. One organization of money is to determine the source of money's value to 
its users. The second way to conceptually organize money is by mapping it to a particular 
geographical space or historical time - an approach known as monetary geography. While 
there is a significant amount of overlap between these two methods of understanding money, 
using one or both of these two methods of understanding money is valuable to help one 
understand the way money works in the broader economic system. In this chapter, I will first 
address the value/source component of money. Then I will address the question of monetary 
geography or how monies are mapped to time and geographic space. Last, I will attempt to 
categorize current and existing forms of money using the concepts addressed in the first two 
sections. 
Value-derivation 
In this section, I will review the three general ways economic systems use tokens and 
objects as money: barter systems, commodity money systems, and fiduciary money systems. 
To understand why money exists, it helps to have a background in how money was 
introduced in human society. Barter systems are generally thought to have started when life 
began to become complicated for humans. Once upon a time, humans were, at least 
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theoretically, self-sufficient. In families or other small social units, they were able to 
produce everything they needed: food, clothing, and shelter. If they were not able to 
produce or procure something, they did without it. However, as less nomadic lifestyles 
evolved, humans began to find that either they could not produce all things they wanted by 
themselves, or they realized that it was much more efficient to encourage specialization. 
Instead of investing personally in a hand mill, Farmer Jones would take his grain harvest to 
Thomas the Miller. In exchange for a portion of the farmer's crop, the miller would grind the 
grain into flour. This was advantageous to both parties; Farmer Jones didn't have to invest in 
a hand mill to grind a small amount of grain and Thomas Miller could invest in a more 
efficient gristmill. Miller could also measure his services in bushels of grain per acre, as 
could the baker. In this case, both parties could focus on doing what they did best - their 
specialty. This increase in specialization and the added benefit of being able to measure what 
was owed to whom made barter systems an important part of human society and economic 
activity. 
However, barter exchanges assumed each party had goods and services the other 
needed. This limited the ability of one individual to act in the market. Because there was 
only so much demand for the goods or services of one individual, barter systems became 
self-limiting. For example, Thomas Miller needed only so much grain from the farmers he 
served. However, he might need some assistance in his trade, or the local carpenter's help to 
repair his windmill - either of whom might need grain in turn. Record-keeping gradually 
became difficult. 
In addition, the degree of specialization illustrated in the example was fairly rare until 
sometime in the second half of the second millennium. As long as the barter systems 
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functioned in limited regions with low levels of economic specialization, barter worked 
relatively well. However, societies continued to develop in complexity. Because societies 
were limited in their ability to trade due to the limitations of the barter system, more 
abstracted ways of dealing with trade became necessary. While likely developed, at least 
partially, as internal mechanisms for account-keeping in individual villages or duchies, a real 
driving factor for issuing money of some sort was the rapid increase in specialization in some 
sections of the economy. For example, in W estem Europe, the growth of the nation-state 
system combined with increasing military technology to demand the services of a 
professional army. It was much simpler in these situations to pay the soldiers some form of 
money than to pay each individual in foodstuffs according to their services - a more 
traditional method of payment. Once, the duke might have conscripted Farmer Jones and 
Thomas Miller for a particular local battle and sent them home when it was over with a bag 
of potatoes and keg of beer. However, it made little sense for Brutus the Professional 
Swordsman to haul his personal sack of wheat and keg or two of beer on the long army 
marches - or on the long march back to his home after the season's wars. 
The earliest types of money were based on agricultural (e.g. com) or naturally-
occurring ( e.g. cowry shells) commodities. Commodity monies derive their value from the 
raw materials they are composed of, that is, from their commodity's value. Commodity 
monies appear at different places and different times all over the world and in many shapes 
and forms. Commodity monies took many different physical forms because each of the 
places where money was introduced had its own specific needs. The scarcity of a commodity 
was also important. For example, in a normal season, Farmer Jones and Thomas Miller can 
negotiate the appropriate price in bushels so that Jones can get his grain processed, and 
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Miller can eat for the winter. However, what happens in a very good season? Jones has 50 
extra bushels of wheat that he needs to have processed, but the Miller still only needs so 
many bushels of grain to feed himself and his family for the year. Unless Jones can find 
someone else to barter with for his wheat, it will spoil and his extra 50 bushels will have 
become worthless. The commodity he holds has become too widely available to have any 
real value: the law of diminishing returns. In addition, if a commodity was widely available, 
its value might be too low or unreliable to be used as money without fear of inflation - a 
basic supply and demand problem. Therefore, each society had to make wise choices about 
what sort of money should be used. If they did not, users risked having their money become 
worthless. 
Although obviously entirely fictional, the following anecdote from The Hitchhiker 's 
Guide to the Galaxy science fiction series illustrates some of the problems potentially 
associated with commodity money systems - and bad choices in selecting commodities. This 
story takes place when our heroes have stowed away on a spacecraft with a group of 
interplanetary explorers. The ship crash-lands on a planet without modem settlements - but 
with many trees and plants - and the settlers attempt to create civilization and an economy. 
From the community's director of "fiscal policy": 
"Since we have decided a few weeks ago to adopt the leaf as legal tender, we 
have, of course, all become immensely rich ... [b ]ut we have also run into a small 
inflation problem on account of the high level of leaf availability, which means that, I 
gather, the current going rate has something like three deciduous forests buying one 
ship's peanut. .. So, in order to obviate the problem, we are about to embark on a 
massive defoliation campaign ... and burn down all the forests. (Adams 1980, 285) 
Certainly the above anecdote is a bit silly- what semi-intelligent society would 
introduce the use of leaves as money? However, it serves to illustrate the point that not all 
monies are created equal. From his late 18th Century perspective, Adam Smith refers to the 
use of all kinds of money in Wealth of Nations, including salt, which ... 
. . .is said to be the common instrument of commerce and exchanges in 
Abyssinia; a species of shells in some parts of the coast of India; dried cod at 
Newfoundland; tobacco in Virginia; sugar in some of our West India colonies; hides 
or dressed leather in some other countries; and there is at this day a village in 
Scotland where it is not uncommon, I am told, for a workman to carry nails instead of 
money to the baker's shop or the ale-house. 
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Further examples of early forms of money are widespread. Marco Polo reported the 
use of cakes of salt stamped with the ruler's likeness in parts of China. (Kurlansky 2002) In 
addition, many economies used items like cowry shells as money. As the shells were not 
widely available in the places where they were used as money, they were presumably these 
acquired via traveling traders; the shells then gradually trickled through the economy. In the 
Roman Empire, unmarked but standard pieces of copper and other metals were issued for 
monetary use. Standardized metallic objects such as these tended to be issued by some level 
of governing authority, often from an emperor or from a lesser prince. However, 
standardization of these unmarked pieces of metal was difficult to prove - as was assaying its 
metallic content. The same difficulty in determining commodity content was often true of 
the salt cakes and the sugar Smith referenced. Because the value of these monies was 
directly connected to the commodity content of the item in question, being able to figure out 
the exact content (and thus the validity) of the money was extremely important. Therefore, 
one needed money that was easy to assay and difficult to fake. 
Ease of identification and the difficulty of falsification were part of the reason that 
gold and silver were preferred over other types of money and were supported so completely 
by Smith and his contemporaries. Unlike salt or skins, gold and silver had little use other 
than money or jewelry, and were more difficult to counterfeit than other money media. In 
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addition, technology development over the second half of the second millennium allowed 
increasing standardization with metals. In some places, stamping, or otherwise marking the 
pieces of money grew quite common. In addition to allowing standardization between coins, 
it allowed individual money issuers to identify their own coins, particularly as technology for 
stamping and otherwise standardizing money developed over the Middle Ages and into the 
industrial revolution. However, problems with counterfeiting were, and remain, a reality. 
The producers and users of money dealt with the problem of counterfeiting in several 
different ways, depending on what kind of entity was in charge of issuing money. For 
example, some countries made counterfeiting money punishable by death or extreme pain. 
In other places, counterfeiting was more or less ignored - but money users generally knew 
which money was reliable and which was not. Because monies normally were not restricted 
to one geographic region, there were often multiple monies existing in one economic area. In 
places where this was the case, one currency or group of currencies - the more stable, less 
often counterfeited ones - would disappear from circulation and be kept by consumers as a 
store of value, and thus would rise in value. The less reliable money(s) would continue in 
circulation, often at declining value. This situation, where "bad money drives out good," 
became known as "Gresham's Law." Modem day examples of Gresham's Law exist in 
many parts of the world. For example, in the last decade, the U.S. dollar became the 
preferable store of value in Argentina, resulting in the devaluation of the Argentinean peso. 
Although almost certainly an improvement over the barter system, commodity 
currencies were far from perfect. While a commodity currency may have had stable value in 
one area, its value may have been unstable in another area or at a different time - in large 
part because the money's value was based on the value of the commodity it resulted from. If 
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the commodity suddenly became plentiful, the money's value would drop. Commodity 
money also meant that one had to carry around large amounts of one's currency of choice -
and know the preferable currency for each area one traveled to.3 That would mean that a 
trader would need to carry the appropriate currency for each of the areas to where he would 
travel. Although coined gold and silver gradually became the preferable units of exchange 
across wide trading areas, carrying around large quantities of gold - whether raw or minted 
gradually became unfeasible as nations and economies began to modernize. Gold and silver 
coins were fairly heavy and it became inconvenient to carry large quantities of them for the 
many transactions one made that were too complex for bartered exchanges. Unwilling to 
move completely away from the use of gold and coinage, people deposited their gold in 
banks or safes for which paper notes were issued by the banking facility - these were literally 
certificates of deposit. These papers were tradable and were exchangeable for the specified 
amount of gold or silver stored in the vault. These were issued by nearly as many institutions 
as there were safe deposit places. Much like other forms of commodity money, as long as 
the notes were trustworthy, the certificates of deposit tended to be accepted as worth as much 
as their convertible worth on paper. The worth of the money was based directly on the 
holder's ability to produce the commodity the paper was intended to replace. 
However, these certificates of deposit also gradually followed Gresham's Law as 
well: people spent or converted the untrustworthy notes into more stable currencies as soon 
as they could, and kept the ones that were the most trustworthy to store value in. Under these 
situations, banks founded by national governments also began introducing bank notes. To 
3 That meant that traders would need salt in Abyssinia if they wanted preferable trading rates, nails if they 
planned to go to Scotland, and so on (according to the notations on money cited by Smith). 
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some extent, Gresham's Law played a role in the increasing acceptance of those currencies. 
Legal obligations to use only national money also started playing a role in the growing use of 
nationally-issued currencies. The road to national fiscal policy, including coercion to 
exclusively use national currencies was long and fractious. In the U.S. case, Viviana Zelizer 
describes debate about whether and how the United States should issue money as "one of the 
most explosive political and social issues of the late 19th Century" (Zelizer 1994, 14). 
Gradually, the banknotes issued by national banks replaced those issued by non-national, 
local, banks. This occurred in the United States some time in the late 19th Century. 
Current money is considered fiat or fiduciary money. Money is considered 
"fiduciary" because there is a strong degree of trust in the money. There is also a concept of 
governmental trusteeship involved with fiduciary money. In the fiduciary construction of 
money, money has worth because someone says it has worth and promises to back its worth, 
not because it has worth based on something specific like barter or commodity value. Most 
important to the value of fiduciary money is that money's users trust the issuer of the money 
they use and thus also trust that the money will retain its value over time. 
While in one sense the idea of fiduciary money is not far removed from the idea of 
gold being worth a particular amount of money, as a "thing" gold had socially acceptable 
value more in line with its face value than did paper monies. Instead of having some "thing" 
on which the value of a particular piece of money was to be based, like com or gold, in a 
fiduciary money system, the rule of law and rules of economics stand behind the value of 
money. In non-money constructs, agents have fiduciary responsibility- or responsibility to 
act for the principal in a way that is beyond reproach. Thus, the worth of fiduciary monies is 
directly tied to the ability and likelihood of a country or issuer of money to honor their 
obligation and the monies' users trust of that ability. At this stage, money becomes 
inextricably connected to particular times, places, and governments - or monetary 
geography. 
Monetary Geography 
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Mapping specific types of money to its particular time and place in history is a 
bigger-picture approach to the analysis of money than the value-derivation approach. 
Typically, when one discusses money in this way, the beginning unit of analysis is the 
nation-state - which is nearly always seen as the rightful owner of monetary policy and 
monetary issuance. However, money and the nation are perhaps not as connected as U.S 
dollar users, or British pound users might think. In one of the most important books written 
on this subject, Benjamin Cohen's Geography of Money (1998), Cohen describes a series of 
myths and truths about money, including the One Nation/One Money myth. Prior to the 
passage of the Treaty ofWestphalia,4 the monetary system was as fractured as the state 
system itself- and to some degree continues to be so. Nevertheless, national money 
represents a good starting point for my analysis. I will then address monies associated with 
supranational units or empires, as well as the phenomenon of dollarization. 
In the case of national currencies, money takes on a territorial component. Money is 
issued by a nation-state for use within its borders - a specific geographical area. Use of other 
monies is often outlawed within that region. From a theoretical perspective at least, the 
issuers of the nioney have official jurisdiction in all major monetary affairs in their region: 
how much money exists in the system, what it is worth, and how it can be used. Whether this 
4 The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 represented the end of a long period of war in Europe (the Eighty Year's 
War and the Thirty Year's War). It also set forth the beginning of the modem nation-state system with 
delineated boundaries and absolute national sovereignty. (Held 1996, 70) 
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is actually the case is up for debate and will be addressed in the next chapter. Regardless, the 
national governments that originally issued national currencies assumed they could control 
their own currencies to some degree. Of course, there were multiple reasons for introducing 
national monies, and there many countries that issued their own currencies between the 
beginning of the nation-state system after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and the current 
era. However, two analysts have been able to offer theories that go a long way toward 
explaining the primary operating reasons for why countries would issue their own monies 
(Helleiner 2003, Cohen 1998). 
Helleiner sees four key incentives for nation:-state adoption of national currencies, 
most of which coincide with Cohen's analysis. The first major reason Helleiner cites for 
adoption of these currencies is that national currencies alter transaction costs for domestic 
markets. This results in two general outcomes. One, having a national currency reduces 
transaction uncertainty. Because the unit of exchange is, by definition, the unit of account as 
well, more transactions are encouraged. This increases transaction density in the area of the 
national currency. The second way transaction costs are altered is by the governmental 
requirement that domestic transactions be conducted in the currency of the nation-state. 
Because costs of exchanging money are no longer a consideration in transactions, the state 
increases the financial benefit of doing business domestically rather than relying on foreign 
trade. This is particularly in countries surrounded by nation-states with their own national 
currencies. National currencies also reduce the transaction costs that occur in places where 
multiple currencies co-exist and all transactions must consider the worth of multiple 
currencies. This means that one can encourage growth within one's own economy, which 
ultimately helps one currency gain comparative advantage. This coincides nicely with 
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Cohen's analysis that states have a theoretical ability to use a national currency to "influence 
and perhaps even manage the pace of market activities" (Cohen 1998, 42). Once a state has 
its own currency, this can often be done by either manipulating the money supply or the 
exchange rate relative to other currencies. 
The second reason that states introduced national currencies, according to Helleiner, 
is that states have a strong desire to control the domestic money supply. This helps reduce 
the probability of extreme inflation or deflation and other money supply problems. Cohen 
also points out that this control assists governments to avoid reliance on other countries or 
countries' economies. 
Both Cohen and Heilleiner agree that another major reason nation-states adopt 
national currencies is that national leaders have a powerful desire to create domestic fiscal 
assistance. They gain this benefit through seigniorage, or the financial benefit derived by 
money issuers between the face value of a currency and the cost incurred in issuing that 
particular money. Once, this benefit was gained by allowing the treasury to print more 
money. Now seigniorage happens through the issuance of government bonds or securities 
and the associated manipulation of the interest rate. 
A fourth major incentive to adopt national currencies is the perceived connection 
between the development of a national currency and the development of national identity. 
Ultimately, it seems that national currencies and national identity develop together and 
reinforce each other. This was particularly important for the new and developing nation-
states in the 19th Century, including the United States (Helleiner 2002). Cohen also suggests 
that territorial or national currencies promote a "sense of collectivity useful to rulers who 
may be wary of ... division or dissent" (Cohen 1998, 35). Thus, national currencies also 
assist in the development of a sense of a national identity. 
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Both Cohen's and Helleiner's explanations for national currencies are ideals and 
originated in a system with limited exposure to the "outside world" and relatively slow 
moving economic and transport systems. It is somewhat hard to tell whether the system of 
national currencies ever worked according to the ideals scholars speculate that they were 
based on. Currency substitution has been quite common in the global economy, it involves 
the substitution (typically by consumers) of the national currency with another typically more 
stable currency. In cases where this happens, the local currency is typically grossly 
devalued. 
One modem example of currency substitution is known as dollarization. In 
dollarizing economies, consumers replace the use of the national currency with U.S. dollars, 
typically using it primarily as a store of value. However, Cohen notes that nation-states 
value the international status that goes with having a national currency. The symbolic value 
national money has for a country together with the sense of collective identity a national 
currency creates is often more valuable to a country than the financial benefits associated 
with issuing an unique currency (Cohen 2001). In such cases, nation-states have fought the 
effects of dollarization, often by accusing those storing dollars of traitorous action. In some 
cases, countries have forcibly converted dollars deposited in their banks to the local currency. 
This happened most recently in Argentina in the early part of 2002, with the value of the 
Argentine peso subsequently tumbling, due to the fact that a huge percentage of the nation's 
wealth was held originally in dollars. While the Argentine government intended to increase 
the strength of the peso relative to the dollar, the tactic backfired on them, incurring a huge 
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loss of wealth for many Argentine citizens. However, foreign deposits were recently restored 
by action from Argentina's top court (Rohter 2003). 
Currency conversions such as those made by the Argentine government are made 
much easier for national governments by the fact that the dollar deposits in question were in 
electronic format. This same fact disadvantaged the deposit holders, in this particular case, 
but made getting dollars easier in the first instance. Dollarization is one of the many political 
and economic phenomena resulting in part from increasing electronic availability of 
currency. Where once Argentineans who wanted to save money in dollars needed someone 
to import the dollars, with electronic money they could electronically access international 
currency exchange markets, buy dollars and store them electronically in bank deposit 
accounts - which were then converted into pesos. Therein lies one of the most critical 
questions regarding the current status of money. In an article entitled New Day, False Dawn, 
Cohen asserts that electronic money is helping to undermine the ideal functioning of national 
currencies, by generally increasing the ability of people to transfer money across borders, 
increasing velocity over international borders and ultimately decreasing a government's 
monetary policy choices. As these monetary policy choices are often related to central 
banks, central banks have become the focal point of the current debate over changing 
government control over money. Thus, it becomes important to figure out what forms of 
money central banks must currently deal with and where electronic money fits into the 
general monetary landscape. 
The current monetary landscape consists almost entirely of fiduciary money, although 
commodities from com and wheat to gold are regularly traded on open markets. In addition, 
barter continues to be used on a limited and informal basis in modern economies. 
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However, because there is so much variability in the monetary settlement landscape, 
the remainder of the paper will primarily examine the United States monetary and spending 
systems. Many types of money exist in the current system, beginning with the modern cash 
system and continuing to newer electronic forms. 
The basic form money takes in most parts of the western world is cash, a form of 
paper money, usually with corresponding smaller denomination coins. Paper currencies 
originally developed out of the commodity coinage system and their values were based on 
the commodities they represented - typically gold and silver. As long as the notes were 
trustworthy, they tended to be accepted as worth their face value. Current cash is not 
generally traceable, although individual bills are typically identifiable. They also tend to be 
difficult to copy successfully. 
Bills issued by governmentally-designated sources were gradually consolidated into 
what is now territorial or national currency. In the case of the United States, these were 
distributed by the various Federal Reserve banks. Until World War One, U.S. paper currency 
was still convertible into U.S. held gold, in conjunction with an international monetary 
regime based on the international gold standard. In modified form the gold standard for 
nationally-issued, territorial currencies continued well into the modern era, most notably 
through the Bretton-Woods system, 5 under which participant currencies were set at fixed 
exchange-rates to the dollar, which was in turn based on the value of gold. All Bretton-
Woods participant currencies were convertible to dollars, which were in turn convertible to 
gold. However, the Bretton-Woods system actually undermined many of the benefits of 
5 The Bretton-Woods system was designed in the aftermath of World War Two and was designed to provide a 
basis for a world exchange rate system; the World Bank System and International Monetary Fund were also 
developed as part of that system. 
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issuing national money. Ironically, this was particularly true for the United States because 
the way the different exchange rates were tied meant that any changes the U.S. made to its 
economy were felt by multiple other currencies throughout the Bretton-Woods systems. 
Because of the import/export nature of the U.S. economy, economic problems felt in one part 
of the global system greatly impacted the United States. 
After the demise of the Bretton-Woods system under President Nixon, currency 
valuation and exchange rates were freed from the restrictions imposed by the system and 
became free-floating. Values were not based on any objective standard, but were based on 
the relative strength of national economies and the general mood of the currency's users or 
savers. However, the free-floating rates and usage practices dictated by the floating rates of 
the post-Bretton Woods system are part of what has made other forms of currency so 
successful, particularly the Electronic Funds Transfer. 
Deposit Money 
In the United States and in most western economies, most money does not exist in 
cash form. Instead, the vast majority of money resides in some form of a bank account. 
Thus, many modem forms of money amount to methods of gaining access to and transferring 
money based in those accounts. There are several common ways to do this. Withdrawal 
slips and checks are probably the oldest method of transferring money from a deposit account 
to another money consumer. However, there are also a number of newer electronic means to 
access money that I will review in this section. These are separate from the electronic Stored 
Value Systems or e-cash that I will talk about briefly and in the fourth chapter. 
Debit cards are a widely available form of card-based electronic money used for Point 
of Sale (POS) transactions. Although not used to pay for the volume of spending that credit 
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cards are, there are actually more debit than credit cards in the hands of U.S. consumers (BIS 
July 2002). While debit cards look much like credit cards and store their necessary 
information in a magnetic strip on the card with corresponding information on front, in 
function they are much more like miniature Electronic Fund Transfers than like credit cards. 
They are often referred to as check cards for this reason. When one makes a transaction with 
a debit card, money is automatically deducted from the cardholder's account and deposited 
into the merchant's account. ATM cards, or Automatic Teller Machine cards, are also 
considered debit cards but in this case the exchange is from electronic currency (i.e. the bank 
deposit) to cash. Often ATM cards have POS capability as well, although this is often only 
within limited jurisdictions. Some debit card issuers also combine debit cards with credit 
card functions, or access to credit card payment systems. That is, some retailers have 
agreements with credit card companies to allow payments from their cards, by allowing 
ATM card users access to those payment systems it greatly expands their payment options. 
This gives debit card users greater flexibility in how they use the deposits or credit they 
access through this account. Debit cards have an advantage to merchants in that they 
decrease, if not eliminate, the float time consumers have between transaction and settlement 
payment. 
The Electronic Funds Transfer, or EFT, seems to have been driven in large part by 
technological innovation and the desire for cost-saving measures. Introduced first at the 
inter-bank level, EFTs allowed banks to transfers large sums of money between banks 
without moving money around physically, a complicated and costly task. Instead they 
simply transferred the ownership of the money using bits and bytes and kept it stored where 
it was. After the end of the Bretton-Woods system, most money was primarily expressed in 
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bits and bytes. As such, the money itself could be transferred via the same technology that 
once expressed its ownership. In essence, an EFT is the instructions to transfer money from 
one place to another. This can happen through many types of instructions. For example, a 
personal check is essentially the paper way to issue the instructions to begin an EFT. 
In the United States, there are three primary EFT networks for "large-value" systems. 
One, FedWire, is operated by the Federal Reserve Bank system and serves as the 
clearinghouse among the various reserve banks and between reserve banks and private banks. 
FedWire is reserved almost entirely for wholesale operations - the vast majority of 
transactions using Fedwire are in excess of one million dollars. FedWire also serves as one 
of the key transfer points for foreign exchange transactions. The second major EFT network, 
CHIPS, or the Clearinghouse for Inter-Bank Payments, is privately operated and serves as the 
primary clearinghouse for private transactions. 
The third major clearinghouse is associated with retail payments and the Federal 
Reserve's check-clearing system, the Automated Clearing House (ACH). While there is a 
great deal of inter-changeability between the two main systems (CHIPS and FedWire), the 
New York branch of the Federal Reserve where the ACH resides, is more independent and 
serves as a clearing house for personal, commercial, government and travelers' checks, 
commercial and postal money orders. While CHIPS also serves as a clearinghouse for many 
of the same orders, but not for governmental EFTs (BIS September 2002). 
The major clearing houses clear tens of trillions of dollars worth of money a year-
approximately 38 times the U.S. GDP (BIS July 2002). Although the EFT is certainly a 
more convenient way to trade and transfer value, it has also become a possible source of 
monetary insecurity. Because it is so easy to transfer value, people do so - particularly 
investors and currency speculators. The resulting increase in the velocity of money has 
become an important subset in many of the debates concerning globalization and the 
globalization of financial institutions. 
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Credit cards are another widely used POS payment method. They allow consumers to 
delay payment on a good or a service until the end of a certain period of time. Credit card 
companies seem to be technically engaged in money creation in the form of a temporary loan 
to the debtor. Credit can be used to make what would otherwise be cash payments. Credit 
represented in the card can be cashed out - usually accessed via an Automatic Teller 
Machine ( or ATM). The credit merchants accept for payment is exchangeable to the credit 
card issuer for cash deposits, much like the US Dollar was once exchangeable for gold. 
Typically, a credit card will have its necessary information in a machine-readable magnetic 
strip on the back of the card. There is also typically a human-readable version of some of the 
same information on the front. 
While credit cards were originally not electronic, credit card companies quickly 
adapted technology as it came available to them. Because credit card users are not 
immediately exchanging real value, such as the exchange of real deposits I discussed 
previously in the section on EFTs, they are engaged in money creation. The use of credit 
cards ultimately adds money to the national/global economy, at least in the short term. While 
many people carry credit balances, in 2000 over forty-six percent of regular credit card users 
did not carryover a balance at the end of any given month (Manning 2000). Depending on 
the amount of credit issued and used, this effectively reduces the ability of a national 
government to engage in monetary policy. Credit card companies now also accrue some of 
the benefits of seigniorage once reserved as a monopoly of the state. However, credit cards 
have also probably been partially responsible for the growing sensitivity of the money 
particularly to interest rates changes - making that policy mechanism more effective. 
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Credit card companies have a well-established history and are now being used as one 
of the primary means for consumers to conduct business on-line. Although becoming more 
and more popular, credit card transactions still account for less than five percent of paperless 
transfers of money. However, they are still probably the most important and/or pervasive 
types of electronic money around from the perspective of the individual consumer. 
The last major type of electronic money mechanism really has two subsets: electronic 
deposit-access methods and genuine e-cash or Stored Value Systems. Stored Value Systems 
also are probably the form of money least well integrated into the economy. Although a few 
forms of e-cash have already been implemented ( and in most cases failed), most of the 
research in Stored Value Systems is still in fairly preliminary phases, or in limited markets. 
Instead of trying to put this all in one section, I will review this type of money in Chapter 
Three. 
The types of money in the modem payments and settlements system are widely 
varied. However, the existence of one type of money in the system does not preclude the 
~xistence of other types, nor does the development of a new type of money supplant 
preceding ones. Most types of money in the current system are somehow clustered around 
the idea of national currencies, although the strict connection between single nations and 
currencies connection is no longer present. 
Summary 
An essential part of human economic activity, money developed for many different 
reasons and in many different fashions. At a conceptual level, there are two ways to 
understand money, either from where money derives its value, or from its geography. The 
major types of money systems: barter, commodity based, and fiduciary, all developed 
because of specific human and economic needs. Monetary geography also developed for 
similar reasons although it became most important with the development of nation-states. 
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The modem money system is comprised of many different kinds of money, both 
physical (e.g. checks) and electronic (e.g. EFTs and debit cards). While both play important 
roles in modem payments systems; their roles are changing in relation to each other. Stored 
Value Systems, or e-cash, also exists, but primarily as a concept, not a practical matter. 
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Chapter Three: Money, Electronic Money and Governance 
In modern economies, the roles of money and various public financial institutions are 
inextricably intertwined. Although it is probably still possible to hide one's life savings in a 
mattress, it is becoming increasingly difficult to pay for large legal purchases with official 
cash - and impossible to acquire the money for purchases outside of interaction with 
financial institutions at some level. This is particularly true with the new role of electronic 
forms of money like debit cards. Banks, central banks, treasury departments or ministries, 
and private institutions all play a role in the issuance and operation of money. Indeed, it is 
impossible to completely bypass all of these systems in modern economies. Many retailers 
have chosen to accept methods other than cash as payment for goods and services. As such, 
individuals must then choose their payment methods accordingly. In recent decades, retailers 
and consumers have begun to rely in large part on electronic forms of money such as those 
described in the first chapter. This is an increasing trend throughout the post-industrial 
world. This process has implications for multiple levels of society and of government. 
Particularly though, economists and political scientists have tried to analyze these trends in 
terms of their impact on central banks. Therefore, this section of my thesis attempts to 
address the interaction between central banks and money - particularly the kind that comes in 
electronic forms. 
In the United States, the Federal Reserve System (the U.S. Central Bank) has 
responsibility for several major areas of governance concerning the money system. One, 
they are responsible for monetary policy, for keeping the money supply at a certain level and 
targeting inflation to a certain rate. In addition, the Federal Reserve has supervisory and 
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regulatory power over banks that make up the U.S. banking system, as well as having 
influence over the payments system, or the various ways consumers can use forms of money 
to pay for goods and services. The discussion that follows will examine the responsibilities 
of the Federal Reserve System in the context of an examination of the central banking system 
in general. I will first explore the possible impact of these changes on central banks and their 
ability to make and implement monetary policy. I will then explore changes in broader 
abilities to supervise banks and financial institutions, particularly in an era of globalization. I 
will primarily focus on monetary policy in the international sector, and will discuss the 
relevance and role of central banks in the current economy. Finally, I will introduce some of 
the other possible institutions or central bank solutions to address problems introduced in the 
first section. 
Monetary Policy 
In the United States, the Federal Reserve has primary responsibility for monetary 
policy. However, over the last ten to fifteen years, there has been increasing discussion in 
economic and banking circles about the Federal Reserve's ability to carry out that 
responsibility as effectively as it once did. This trend is consistent with trends seen in many 
other central banks worldwide (Friedman 1999). The apparent decreasing ability of the 
Federal Reserve to exercise responsibility is often attributed to the changing environment of 
the economy. While nearly every analyst has his or her own particular twist on the subject, 
there are several general areas of thought on the subject. 
Several authors foresee dramatic changes in the ways central banks will have to 
exercise monetary policy, particularly Mervyn King, Stephen Kobrin, and Benjamin 
Friedman. Kobrin takes a fairly extreme viewpoint and predicts that the need for central 
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banks will be almost completely undermined, and that if central banks are to survive at all, 
they will require massive reorganization. Other authors have somewhat more philosophical 
viewpoints about the influence of e-money on central banks. Some authors, such as David 
Warwick, view electronic money as the next logical step in the process of monetary 
innovation and evolution. They assume that what would happen to central banks is merely 
part of an inevitable process of changes in store for nation-states and their governments. 
Other analysts, such as Anderson, Gutmanis, and Anderson, suggest that what is necessary is 
a more activist role by government regulators in countries that wish to regain central bank 
strength. 
Benjamin Friedman is particularly concerned about the possibility that electronic 
settlement systems will substantially undermine the necessity of monetary reserves. 
Friedman feels that this would ultimately mean central banks would have difficulty setting 
interest rates, thus undermining their most important and effective tool for determining 
monetary policy and price stability. While central bankers would always be able to make 
pronouncements about what they want the interest rate to be, without having the reserves and 
other ability to implement the policy, "they will have about the same force over events as 
Wang Wei-shao's splendid poems" (Friedman 1999, 338).6 
However, while Friedman seems ambivalent about the proper response to this 
question, he is unwilling to write off central banks entirely. Friedman (1999, 2000) seems to 
be echoing concerns raised earlier by Kobrin. However, Kobrin is also concerned with the 
6 Wang Wei-shao was a twelfth century Chinese emperor referenced in a number of Friedman's articles. 
Instead of preparing military for the attacks of Genghis Khan, he wrote a number of disapproving poems, 
thinking them sufficient to get rid his country of Khan's threat. 
geographical element of the modem information technologies associated with electronic 
money and settlement systems. 7 
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Mervyn King is a governor of the Bank of England and has a somewhat more 
pessimistic point of view than does Friedman. He suggests that while the number of central 
banks is currently at its highest level ever ( or was in 1999), because of the changing 
monetary environment, they may already have hit the height of their strength. While the 
stability of interest rates and prices is extremely important to King's conceptualization of 
monetary policy, he also points out that interdependency is increasingly becoming reality in 
the world of monetary relations. In this system, one of the most important real prices in an 
economy is a currency's exchange rate. To keep these rates stable, many countries have 
already informally delegated their monetary policy to another country. 8 While their own 
central banks ostensibly retain control, their role has been reduced to the operational status of 
a currency board (King 1999, 409). 
King sees the structural changes in central banking set-up as less important than the 
technological innovation currently taking place in payments and settlements. King feels that 
new information technologies could potentially allow final settlement to take place entirely 
outside the domain of the central banks. This would remove the central banks' role as 
monopoly supplier of money. This would take away most, if not all, of the banks' leverage 
to enforce the value of transactions. Ultimately, money would not exist in its current form. 
Thus, there would be no role for central banks and the "successors to Bill Gates would have 
put the successors to Alan Greenspan out of business" (King, 411). While King seems more 
7 Kobrin notes that cyberspace has no overt geography, although I would have to disagree with that somewhat. 
Servers, routers, and operators connected with money have to reside somewhere, just not always in the more 
traditional locations money might. 
8 See, for example, the Argentine peso devaluation discussed in Chapter Two. 
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pessimistic than Friedman, he still sees a possible future role for central banks, but warns that 
the role will have to be substantially reinvented. 
In a Journal of International Finance special issue, Michael Woodford expresses 
skepticism for King's claim that currency reserves are necessary to central banks' carrying 
out of monetary policy. He notes that the United States still makes banks hold reserves with 
the central bank (figured on a percentage of bank deposits). However, banks in New 
Zealand, Canada, Sweden, and Australia are only required to hold settlement reserves in 
order to clear their clients' transactions on a day-to-day basis. This greatly increases reserve 
settlement elasticity. In addition, there are already significant levels of electronic funds 
transfers at point of sale (EFTPOS) in New Zealand, among other places (Woodford 2000, 
232). These points illustrate that there already is a disconnection between base money and 
the money supply in these countries. Still, monetary policy continues to be relatively 
effective in these countries and Woodford believes that even if electronic forms of money 
completely replace cash and conventional ways of accessing deposit money, a change he 
finds highly unlikely, central banks should still be able to carry out independent monetary 
policy. 
Woodford also points out that the (overnight) interest rate is the most important rate 
in a monetary policy system. He argues that the overnight interest rate is unaffected by retail 
transactions. Instead, Woodford argues that as long as one unit of a currency is defined to be 
worth a certain amount, the central bank should be able to target interest rates without 
needing to have anything more than positively valued currency reserves. In Woodford's 
analysis, the only conditions under which the central bank would not be able to target interest 
rates is if it were to have negative reserves. Interestingly, small value retail transactions are 
most likely to be affected by the growth of the newest kinds of e-money, and Robert 
Manning argues that it is those very retail transactions, often paid for in the U.S. via credit 
card, which makes the interest rate so much more effective. 
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Charles Goodhardt does not believe that electronic money will supplant existing 
currency needs. As evidence, he notes that much of a currency's value as a medium of 
exchange depends on people's level of trust in it- something that has developed over time. 
Electronic exchanges, particularly anonymous ones, would also rely on trust between the two 
parties engaging in the transaction. Goodhardt sees cash as something substantively and 
sociologically unique. Zelizer comes to much the same conclusion, although she believes 
that cash is not as abstract as Goodhardt seems to believe. Although electronic forms of 
accessing deposit money could replace existing forms like checks, he argues that cash is not 
replaceable. Goodhardt argues that "currency usage is, to some considerable extent, related 
to 'bad' behavior, either individual or governmental" and thus would continue to have use 
(Goodhardt 2000). I consider "bad behavior" to be a pejorative description of the behavior. 
Much of this currency usage is either intended to have an ensured store of value, or to ensure 
the privacy of the user. Approximately one-half of existing U.S. hard currency is held by 
foreign nationals or banks as a store of value. In addition, tens of millions additional dollars 
in cash is held by organized crime, apparently for the ease of payment and relative privacy 
cash offers (Warwick 1998). 
National currencies remain the only legally non-refutable transaction mechanism. 
This gives national currencies special status in their home countries. Cash is also the only 
payment mechanism that does not require the use of an intermediary for each transaction. 
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Merchants and other public officials have a legal obligation to accept this form of payment -
and need to do so in order to stay in business - and avoid legal ramifications. 
Second, Goodhardt points out that central banks have the unique advantage of being 
the only banks in national monetary systems that cannot fail. Because national governments 
recognize the unique tie that central banks have to citizens' trust in government and with 
fiduciary money value, they will support it at nearly all costs. In addition, the International 
Monetary Fund was designed to support central banks in event of crisis. Although Woodford 
characterizes this argument as one where governments protect the central bank through the 
power of taxation, including through huge trading losses, it seems that Goodhardt's real 
argument is that the central bank has a special purpose in national governments. As the only 
bank in the entire banking system that cannot fail, central banks are the best place for final 
clearance of non-cash payments. 
Like Goodhardt, Freedman comes to the conclusion that the central banking system 
has an important role in final settlement. While other banks or financial institutions could 
theoretically replace central banks in this role, central banks have unique advantages over 
other banks. As the sole bank in the system that cannot, by definition, fail, it does not 
increase other banks' risk when used as the "locus of settlement" for final payments 
(Freedman 2000, 222). Second, central banks can act as a lender oflast resort in any 
situation. Additionally, central banks have been given preference over time and have a 
historical record of making final settlement consistently. Freedman also notes a 1999 Bank 
for Int~rnational Settlements report that showed a strong preference among banks and 
retailers for final settlement using central bank money. 
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Even if the majority of settlements are eventually transferred to non-base money in 
order to bypass central banks, central banks still have regulatory authority over financial 
mechanisms and payments. Freedman is fairly unworried about the possibility that electronic 
media would replace central banks who would thus completely lose their ability to conduct 
monetary policy. 
In a 1997 Foreign Policy article, Stephen Kobrin is much more worried about the loss 
of central bank authority than any of the previously mentioned writers. He sees the nature of 
electronic money as fundamentally disconnected from any form of monetary geography or 
central bank control. Kobrin also sees the Internet and information technologies as things 
which truly exist in cyberspace and that the idea of a world without borders will be forced 
into the domain of the central banks. He also sees the imminent approach of peer-to-peer 
cash transactions such as Goodhardt references - basically electronic replicas of cash 
transactions. While Kobrin recognizes that fraud and money laundering would probably be 
an increasing reality, he seems to assume that this progression is inevitable and that without 
grossly curtailing privacy, governments will find these problems impossible to overcome. 
Ewan Anderson et. al., believe it is not only the central banking system whose overall 
power is declining, but that the state itself is becoming a less relevant actor in the arena of 
monetary policy and that policy actions are being limited. However, they assert that the 
United States has and will continue to have a different experience in the world market. They 
also claim that the U. S. is remaking the world economy "in its own image" (Anderson, et. al. 
2000, 27). In addition, they assert that many, if not most, decisions regarding globalization 
and trade liberalization in the market are the result of active, conscious decisions by 
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governments. Thus, even if central banks lose relative control over monetary policy and the 
money supply, it will have been their own governments' decisions to do so. 
In Mad Money, Susan Strange foresees the end of banking and of governments' 
traditional controls over money and the banking system. She is primarily concerned with the 
technological change faced by the financial sector. In the space of less than a century, money 
has changed from something based on commodity systems and slow exchanges under the 
gold standard, to a set of"arranged electrons and photons which ... move around the world at 
the speed of light" (Dee Hock, former Chief Executive of Visa in 1967, quoted Strange 1998, 
24). She points out growing problems with organized crime, money laundering and drug-
trafficking, all of which have been facilitated by the growing ability to transfer money 
electronically. These problems have accelerated in recent years. 
Strange argues that governments must step in and make attempts to re-regulate the 
financial sector both to "moderate and restrain greed ... and to moderate and restrain fear." 
Ultimately, governments must either regulate more stringently or face the increasing 
likelihood that money will outgrow their control permanently. 
Possible Solutions 
In the last decade or so, in an effort to consider some of the questions regarding 
electronic money and central bank control, there have been growing trends toward using 
multilateral agreements and institutionalization within the international monetary sector. 
However, the role played by international institutions in the governance of payments system 
is somewhat ambiguous as the institutions involved lack direct coercive power to implement 
any of their policies. One institution that does play a fairly large role in the international 
monetary system is the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The BIS, which describes 
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itself as "an international organization [sic] which fosters cooperation among central banks 
and other agencies in pursuit of monetary and financial stability," serves various national 
economic entities and central banks as a resource and forum for discussion and issues and 
standards (BIS 2003). Susan Strange refers to the Bank for International Settlements as "the 
central banker's bank." (Strange 1998). Founded in 1930 to deal with the repatriation 
payments mandated by the Treaty of Versailles, it is jurisdictionally and legally separate 
from the other international financial institutions like the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund. However, the BIS has been known to work in conjunction with both 
entities, most notably providing emergency funding to central banks (BIS 2003). 
The Bank for International Settlements performs a number of traditional central 
banking functions, particularly serving as a reserve holder for central banks. In this function, 
it operates as something akin to a super-national Central Bank. This helps facilitate 
international currency convertibility. Most relevant to this paper are the Bank for 
International Settlements' last two primary functions: its role as a "forum for central bank 
cooperation" and the recommendations to the international financial community derived from 
the research it conducts regarding monetary and financial stability. These two most 
important services for central banks regarding electronic money are the Basel Accords and 
the BIS's "forum" function (BIS 2003). 
The Basel Accords of 1988 set a number of basic standards such as minimum 
reserves for the international banking sector. Compliance with these standards, while more 
or less voluntary for the G-10 countries that drew them up, demonstrates a certain minimum 
standard for banking integrity. Currently, there is a second round of negations under way to 
take the newer electronic transmission mechanisms into account. When the original Accord 
was written, the Internet did not exist and therefore neither did capital transmission 
mechanisms that rely on the Internet. However, the vast majority of wholesale capital 
mechanisms rely on dedicated lines (privately held) and proprietary hardware and software 
(BIS, January 2001). 
34 
The Bank for International Settlements has also undertaken a number of studies about 
the possibility of electronic money and its influence on central banks internationally. Those 
studies form much of the initial body of existing work done on the influence of electronic 
money on general payment systems and on monetary governance. 
Another important institutional case study is that of the Organization for Economi.c 
Cooperation and Development's Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF). 
The FA TF was originally designed to help nations combat the growing problem of money 
laundering in the international sector, a result of the decreasing physicality of money. Based 
in Paris and founded as a subset of the OECD, the FATF is responsible for making policy 
recommendations to its member nations that help alleviate the problem of international 
money laundering. Much of the implementation of policy recommendations takes place at 
the national level, but sanctions against violators are recommended by the international body. 
However, these sanctions are to be carried out individually by national governments. The 
recommendations also serve as a warning to potential individual or corporate investors. As 
much of current money laundering takes place via electronic money services, the ability of 
national governments to have oversight over electronic payment systems becomes important 
- especially to any countries that get a significant amount of income from international 
investment or foreign direct investment. 
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While the next set of arguments is somewhat unconnected with international 
institutions, it does seek to address the same questions that the F ATF does. In Ending Cash, 
Warwick argues that cash is more trouble than its worth: people get killed over it, criminals 
use it to conduct business without fear of government discovery, and cash generally plays a 
role in many kinds of violent crime (Warwick 1998). He also argues that the growth of 
electronic forms of money are undermining governments' control over monetary policy and 
driving down its seigniorage revenue and the Federal Reserve's check processing revenues. 
Concerned about this potential loss of control over both monetary policy and the payment 
system, Warwick argues that the Federal Reserve and U.S. Department of Treasury ought to 
consider introducing its own electronic currency system. While I am not entirely convinced 
of the practicability of his argument given current technological constraints, it certainly bears 
mentioning in the context of possible solutions to problems of lowering central bank control 
on the money system. 
Summary 
In modem economies, central banks play a traditionally important role. However, 
conditions in the global economy and with developing information technologies -
particularly electronic money - appear to be changing and possibility weakening central 
banks' ability to maintain their traditional functions. Analysts do not agree on the reality of 
what is happening and offer a number of possible explanations for what the likely outcomes 
of the situation are. 
Central banks are not the only actors in the international monetary system and are 
joined in the system by international organizations. These international organizations may be 
able to assist central banks in performing their various functions. Last I discuss a proposal by 
Warwick in which he argues that the only way for central banks to regain their ability to 
fulfill their traditional functions, is for central banks to become the monopoly issuer of 
electronic money as they are of hard currencies. 
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Chapter Four: The Future of Money? 
An important underlying issue in assessing future regulatory and governance issues is 
the make-up of the future monetary environment. What kind of electronic money outcomes 
are in the realm of the possible? Which technologies will actually work? As I outlined in the 
first chapter, there are two general categories for electronic money: electronic deposit-access 
methods like EFTs and debit cards and genuine e-cash. Proposed forms of e-cash are all 
based on variations on the idea of a Stored Value System (SVS) and will also be referred to 
in that way. While both categories of e-money are important, the methodologies associated 
with electronic deposit-access methods like EFTs and debit cards seem to be mainly settled 
and the technologies in a range of known entities. However, the technologies behind e-cash 
protocols are not yet settled, although there has been some important groundwork done in the 
area of e-cash protocols and Stored Value Systems in both card and network forms. In this 
chapter, I first examine the major ideas behind proposed e-cash protocols and how they 
might fit into the broader monetary system. I then review the major areas of Stored Value 
System application and what types of applications might be possible. I will discuss some of 
the various e-cash setups, and analyze whether an electronic equivalent of cash is likely or 
possible. I will also offer an assessment about possible future e-cash technologies and what 
is technologically possible or probable for future use, particularly given current systemic 
constraints. Last, will offer an analysis of how e-cash will likely fit into the monetary 
economy in future 
E-money v. e-cash 
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There are a good number ofreferences in recent literature on money to "stored-value 
cards" and "e-cash," as well as to some of the names of specific monies: jlooz, beenz were 
among the biggest. There is a common methodological theme in each of these systems: each 
takes money from one system - whether a bank deposit, a cash/currency payment, or a credit 
card - and puts the value into another system which is then used to make payments. I refer to 
this method of payment as a Stored Value System, or SVS. Storage of value takes many 
forms; value can either be stored on a card, online, or in an account stored on the owner's 
computer. Storage location and format vary in relation to the intended end users of the 
stored value. 
From a technological point of view, there are three primary types of e-cash, all based 
on the idea of a Stored Value System. One type is a card-based Stored Value Card where the 
value in the account is stored on the card itself, either in a magnetic stripe or on a small chip. 
Value is then accessed locally - typically at the Point of Sale (POS). The second type of e-
cash is a solely network-based format, where value is stored in some network device and 
accessed via software means over the network; these are typically used with a remote POS. 
The last main type of e-cash is a network-based Stored Value card system, where value is 
stored remotely but accessed via a card. 
The Protocols 
In Digital Cash, Peter Wayner wryly notes that a major reason the net evolved as a 
"generous place where people freely gave away information" was that you could "ship a 
megabyte across the country in a flash, but you couldn't move a penny." For this reason and 
because of some of the money possible applications that will be outlined in the next section, 
as well as a general assumption that increasing electronic commerce demanded a "new" 
electronic way to exchange money, a number of companies and researchers began trying to 
develop some version of digital cash that had previously existed only in theory. E-cash is 
related to e-money in much the same way cash is related to money in the current system. 
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In a normal monetary economy like that of the United States, Canada or the countries that 
make up the European Union, money is judged by how well it performs the general functions 
of money. As stated in the first chapter, general definitions of money focus on three broad 
tests of functionality: 
1. Can the money be used as a general unit of exchange? 
2. Can the money be used as a store of value? 
3. Can the money be used as a unit of account? (Cohen 1998) 
Thus, any test of electronic money must first be tested by how well it fills the general 
functional requirements of money. Generally, practically all money currently in broad 
circulation is connected to base money, or the fiat currencies issued by nation-states or 
entities such as the European Monetary Union. In modem economies, this money does not 
often take the form of cash, but of checks, EFTs or other deposit methods into deposit-ready 
accounts. Thus, many forms of electronic money are actually judged in terms of how it 
complements the work of the underlying deposited base money it accesses. In our 
economies, we have placed nearly (but not perfectly) the same trust in checks and EFTs as in 
cash. Often there are caveats to accepting or spending these kinds of moneys: the check 
must be from a known, local bank, and have a local address, persons using checks must 
authenticate themselves with another form of identification. However, barring fraud, the 
check or EFT is eventually converted into deposit money. Importantly, this deposit money is 
then convertible into the U.S. dollars, Euros and so forth that it was originally denominated 
in. Thus, forms of money in the current currency system are overwhelmingly either fiat cash 
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itself, or serve as an access method to obtain deposit money (like the checks and EFTs 
referred to earlier). General forms of electronic money are therefore not disconnected from 
base money in any substantive way. However, e-cash faces a somewhat different problem; it 
also needs to serve the major functions that modem cash serves, it needs to be readily 
identifiable, and relatively anonymous. 
Electronic cash is designed by the cryptologists to be an electronic version of cash, or 
the bills and coins that circulate in moneyed economies. While early attempts at 
implementing e-cash protocols did not perform well, those in research and development with 
monetary technologies currently believe that stored-value systems in both card-based and 
network-based forms are the future of money (McDonough 1996, BIS July 2002, Melander 
1998, Shneier 1996, Wynton 1996). In some cases, authors go so far as to assume that e-cash 
can replicate the functionality of cash and ultimately replace it in the economy. While credit 
cards payments account for a vast majority of payments in electronic commerce right now, 
hope, it seems, springs eternal in the human breast - or at least those of the computer 
engineers and cryptographers who design e-cash systems. However, the ability of e-cash to 
replace cash, or even to replace credit cards as the primary electronic means of payment, 
seems dubious. Cash, or the bills and coins that make up national currencies, is available in 
multiple denominations, can be spent anonymously, is universally acceptable within its 
geographic area, and tends to be difficult to counterfeit, whereas electronic cash is not so 
difficult to counterfeit. In most countries there are also strong sanctions against 
counterfeiting as well. 
As electronic cash is intended and designed to be separate from but equal to existing 
base money or cash, one needs to offer some additional requirements to make them relatively 
equivalent. In Applied Cryptography, Schneier introduces Okamoto and Ohta's six 
properties of a robust and universally applicable e-cash system. By outlining these 
properties, Okamoto and Ohta hope to build a profile and best practices for building e-cash 
systems. 
I. Independence. The security of the digital cash is not dependent on any physical location. The cash 
can be transferred through computer networks. 
2. Security. The digital cash cannot be copied and reused. 
3. Privacy (Untraceability). The privacy of the user is protected, no one can trace the relationship 
between the user and his purchases. 
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4. Off-line Payment. When a user pays for a purchase with electronic cash, the protocol between the user 
and the merchant is executed off-line. That is, the shop does not need to be linked to a host to process 
the user's payment. 
5. Transferability. The digital cash can be transferred to other users. 
6. Divisibility. A piece of digital cash in a given amount can be subdivided into smaller pieces of cash in 
smaller amounts. (Okamoto and Ohta; referenced Schneier, 1996) 
In theory, Okamoto and Ohta's proposal looks perfectly reasonable. Technologically, 
however, it seems appears otherwise. For this reason, I consider it important to understand 
the underlying foundations. E-cash protocols follow some general guidelines, and so by 
reviewing one of the most common basic principles for network-based e-money, I hope to 
illustrate what must happen in basic electronic money systems. As is traditional when 
describing cryptography, I will use "Alice," "Bob," and "Carol" to represent the parties 
engaged in the transaction. Although it probably goes without saying, all three are 
completely gender-neutral parties and could really be named anything. Instead of attempting 
to write out the protocol itself, I will explain a physical analogy of the protocol. 
1. Alice writes out 100 anonymous money orders for $1000 each. On each of the 
money orders she writes a unique random number long enough to make it unlikely 
for another person to randomly choose the same number. 
2. Alice takes 100 envelopes and puts one money order and one piece of carbon 
paper in each envelope. She seals the envelope and gives them to Bob the Banker. 
3. Bob randomly opens 99 of the 100 envelopes and confirms that each envelope 
contains a money order for $1000 with a unique number, and a piece of carbon 
paper. 
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4. Bob takes the 100th envelope and signs it. The signature goes through the carbon 
paper onto the money order. Bob returns the signed but unopened 100th envelope 
to Alice and deducts $1000 from her bank account. 
5. Alice takes the envelope to a merchant, Carol, where she then opens it and spends 
the money. 
6. Carol checks for Bob's signature to verify that the money order is legitimate. 
7. When Alice spends the money order, Carol asks her to write a random identity 
number on the order. 
8. Alice does so. 
9. Carol takes the money order to Bob to redeem. 
10. Bob takes the money order and makes sure that no money order with the same 
unique random number has been deposited previously. If it has not, Bob credits 
Carol's account $1000 and records the unique random number and the random 
identity number in the bank's database. 
11. If there is record of the unique random number, Bob does not accept the money 
order. He then compares the random identity number written on the order to the 
one in the database. If it is the same, Bob knows Carol cheated and photocopied 
the money order after it was spent. If it is different, Bob knows Alice cheated and 
photocopied the money order. (Paraphrased, Schneier 1996, 6.4). 
In this system Alice represents any e-cash user, Bob represents the cash issuing 
authority or financial database protocol, and Carol the POS entity. This type of process 
underlies any implementation of a network-based e-cash system. This system is intended to 
allow each transaction to be discrete and anonymous. When Alice and Bob negotiate the 
value to be placed in Alice's storage device (the money order in this case), Carol knows 
nothing about it. Bob also validates Alice's spending without seeing the unique random 
number on the order, but because he has seen a random selection of the other possible money 
orders, he is reasonably sure that its value will be the same as all the other money orders and 
that the unique random number is indeed random. When Carol and Alice negotiate a sale, 
Carol knows only the value ofthe money order Alice gives her, the unique random number 
on the original money order, and the random identity number Alice used to authenticate its 
spending. Carol presumably does not need to know Alice's true identity. 
When Carol goes to Bob to redeem Alice's money order, she only gives him the 
transaction information and her account information. If the money has been further sub-
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divided, Bob presumably can't make assumptions about who might have spent the money, 
although depending on how the unique random number associated with the original money 
order was spent, he could likely have recorded that information when he deducted the money 
from Alice's account. On the other hand, if Alice was particularly concerned with 
anonymity, she could have by-passed her account and paid for the money order with cash 
acquired from a different source. Overall, there are a number of times where either Bob or 
Carol could presumably find out Alice's identity, but it might take further analysis. Carol 
cannot respend Alice's money order without redeeming it through Bob. More importantly, 
while Bob can check whether Alice has given Carol a legitimate copy of her money order, 
there is no system in place to prevent Alice from copying her signed money order before she 
spends it with Carol and then spending it again with a new random identity number with 
David before Carol has a chance to take her copy to Bob. While Alice would be cheating, 
without knowledge of the spending system Bob cannot stop double spending, particularly if 
he does not have information about Alice - which is entirely possible if she by-passes the 
account check with Bob by paying with cash. Unless Bob is forced to honor the money 
order, this ultimately harms David and lowers his trust in the system, or the value of the 
money. 
If one returns this analogy to a digital environment, fiber optics, routers and servers 
are only so fast. Although they might seem so to human eyes, transactions are never 
perfectly instantaneous. In the aftermath of the financial market collapses after September 
11, 2001, the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve proposed that any clearinghouse that was responsible for a substantial 
majority of any particular financial mechanism, be required to have a geographically distant 
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back-up facility, with the identical material as the main facility. While the original study 
proposed a minimum distance of 300 miles later industry studies found that due to constraints 
in physical infrastructure and processing speeds, the secondary facility could be a maximum 
of 75 miles away (Rosen 2003). 
E-cash Applications 
Stored Value Systems such as the one outlined in the previous section are the form of 
electronic money in the most limited use in the United States according to the most recent 
reliable data: a 2002 BIS report on electronic money usage in 2000.9 The SVS is often 
generically referred to as "e-cash," as that is what it was designed to mimic. The direct 
transaction costs associated with SVSs are typically very low, particularly when compared to 
the one to two percent transaction fees charged by the more traditional credit companies. 
Stored-value cards, ore-cash, come in two primary forms; network-based and card-based, 
forming the linking between card-based and network-based electronic money systems. 
One of the distinguishing features of a Stored Value System is the use of digital 
wallet technology - also called an electronic or digital purse. The digital wallet is the 
package of encryption software used during electronic and/or e-commerce transactions. The 
wallet must contain a digital certificate to uniquely identify the owner/account owner of the 
wallet and other payment information. The digital certificate authenticates the card user to 
the payment system. The wallet is the piece of software that allows payment and is stored on 
the device that the system users use to access the value of the card. For a network-based 
card, the wallet can be stored in a software program on the users' computer, or on a network 
9 One of the large problems with assessing electronic money that I ran into was the lack of standardized 
information in a timely manner. While the data offered by the BIS reports is quite good, there is approximately 
a two year lag between when the data was current and the time it is issued. 
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computer accessed via some other login means. In a card-based system, the wallet is typically 
stored on the card itself, either in the magnetic strip or in a chip. In a personal computer-
based wallet (for a-network based account or card account), the electronic wallet is usually 
accessed by a PIN. This may also be the case for a card-based system. However, this leads 
to some potential security problems. For example, in a card-based system, simple possession 
of the card might be all that was needed for someone to access the value stored in the wallet. 
In this case, authentication would simply be to the possessor of the device, that is, if someone 
has possession of the card, they are authenticated to it, offering no more security than 
traditional cash in a traditional wallet. Authentication could also take place through non-
electronic means, i.e. matching physical signatures on a card. Currently technology would 
probably require a human intermediary in this case. The digital wallet may be used in 
conjunction with nearly any encryption or authentication technology. 
Card-based Stored Value Systems ( or Stored Value Cards - SVC) have been used on 
a limited basis for a number of years. For example, a transit company might issue an SVC to 
be used solely on transit related purchases. In the United States, many college campuses use 
some variation on the stored-value cards to allow students to pay for small transactions like 
vending machine purchases, copy machines, or laundry machines without using cash. Iowa 
State University's CyCash system is one such example. However, like many such systems, 
the CyCash system is limited to a small jurisdiction. In the United Kingdom there has been 
experimentation with a similar system called Mondex on university campuses, while it has 
been somewhat successful, there have been very mixed results. There have also been 
attempts to introduce Mondex in Japan. 
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In the United States, the existing infrastructure for card-based systems heavily 
preferences magnetic stripes like CyCash and Mondex. However, newer cash-based systems 
globally typically have their vital information stored on an embedded computer chip instead 
of a magnetic strip; these systems are known as "smart cards." In addition, magnetic strips 
are in use with some of the systems. The computer chip ( or magnetic strip) uniquely 
identifies the card - much like the serial number on a bill - and also contains the value 
remaining on the card. Any information needed to use the card, including information about 
the remaining card value, is stored on the card itself. Smart cards tend to be a more stable 
medium than the magnetic stripes, and can store much more information. In any case, after a 
stored value card is purchased, it can be used to pay for purchases at any physical store that 
has the ability to accept the card. The stored-value card can also be used for on-line 
transactions provided the user has the necessary equipment. In addition to the benefits of low 
transaction costs and presumed anonymity offered by general SVS systems; card-based 
stored-value systems offer instantaneous transactions like ordinary cash (BIS November 
2001, McCullagh 2001 ). 
It is in regards to these Stored Value Systems and cards that the issue of electronic 
money begins to become the most complicated. For starters, as implied earlier, SVC systems 
do not actually have to have a physical form. Value can be stored and added or subtracted 
either on- or off-line, depending on the particular stored value system. In addition, there are 
currently in the US, a number of technologies that do not fit the primary criteria of money, 
although they take certain forms that various observers believe could eventually become 
electronic money. For the ease of understanding these particular payment system issues, a 
study undertaken by Melander et. al. for the RAND Corporation defines four individual 
models of what they term "cyberpayments." (Melander 1998) I found their designations 
helpful in understanding how to differentiate between the different system applications -
although one must keep in mind that the technological SYS model employed in each of the 
various models does not need to be consistent throughout. For example, although the 
Merchant Issuer Model calls for a Smart Card, the technology used would not need to be 
card-based at all. Instead, it could refer to a network-based digital wallet model such as is 
used by many online merchants. 
1. The Merchant Issuer Model: Smart Card issuer and seller of goods are the same. 
2. The Bank Issuer Model: Merchant and Smart Card issuer are different parties. 
Transactions are cleared through traditional financial systems. 
3. Non-Bank Issuer: Users buy electronic cash from issuers using traditional money 
and spend the electronic cash at participating merchants. Issuer subsequently 
redeems the electronic cash from the merchant. 
4. Peer-to-peer Model: Bank or non-bank issued electronic cash is transferable 
between users. Only point of contact between the traditional payments system and 
electronic cash is the initial purchase of electronic cash from the issuer and 
redemption of electronic cash from individuals or merchants. 
(Melander 1998, 12) 
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The Merchant Issuer Model: The types of money most likely comprising this system 
are gift cards, airline frequent flier miles and similar coupons or "bonuses" offered by 
merchants to pay for their merchandise. They can be earned ( e.g. frequent flier miles) or 
purchased (e.g. gift cards). While not widely accepted enough to be considered "money," 
gift cards are an important part of the monetary economy as they are responsible for billions 
of dollars in purchases annually. Many gift cards actually employ a form of network-based 
Stored Value card. Gift cards in the United States typically are combination SVCs, i.e. while 
there is a physical card, all card value is network based and accessed with the card. In 
addition, many of these forms of SVC that are now in the widest use actually had much more 
limited beginnings. For example, the Octopus card in Hong Kong began as a payment 
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syste:rn for the public transit system. Adopted the common method for payment by multiple 
Hong Kong transit providers, the contactless Octopus card quickly became widely used, 
accounting for almost all transactions in the transit system, nearly all of which were under a 
dollar at a time. Eventually, some restaurateurs recognized that nearly all their patrons had 
these cards. In the interests of getting any edge of profit possible on their competitors, the 
restaurateurs invested in the infrastructure that allowed them to read and take value from the 
Octopus card. This increased the convenience for the restaurant's patrons and allowed the 
restaurants to dramatically reduce their transaction costs (Leander 2001, Munroe 2002). 
Bank Issuer Model: Bank issuers of electronic money are fairly common. Debit 
cards are a very good example of this: one accesses money in an existing account through 
electronic means and either receives cash or pays for items electronically - either by means 
of a console or the Internet. Electronic billpay from bank account to company - say for a 
heating bill- would be another example of how the bank issuer model functions. 
Non-Bank Issuer Model: Most examples of the non-bank, non-merchant, issuer 
model of SVS I have seen are completely network-based. This is the sub-category observers 
seemed to be the most excited about in the mid-nineties. Now, according to at least one 
journalist, "[t]he electronic cash landscape is littered with the looted corpses of companies 
that tried and failed to compete with credit cards for online purchases" (McCullagh 2001). 
However, most of the failed examples of Non-Bank issued network-based SVC system -
digicash.com, flooz.com, and beenz.com were designed to be "fun." Said one now 
unemployed executive, "[the new currencies] are meant to be played with, not locked away 
in a vault" (Satran 2000). Although the new currencies were delineated in dollars, most 
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consumers didn't seem particularly interested in using them other than for their novelty and 
spending factors, not as a store of value. 
Another interesting subcategory of Stored Value System is the network-based e-cash, 
e-gold.com. This may be the only remaining example of a genuine gold standard system. 
Unlike its counterparts digicash, flooz, and beenz, it is still quite strong and is unique enough 
to merit a short case study. 
E-gold.com was started as a Scottish-based Islamic group's attempt to return to 
Islamic law concerning money, which requires the use of precious metals as currency. E-
gold is not based on any particular national currency, one actually buys shares of e-gold's 
bullion stockpiles of gold, silver and palladium held in trust in vaults in Dubai and London. 
The exchange rate of e-gold then floats in relation to the price of gold to given national-
currency. Internationally, many internet-based companies accept e-gold as payment. In 
addition, a number of subsidiary companies have been started that allow one to convert e-
gold to one of many national currencies. Unlike beenz and flooz, e-gold (as a gold-based 
currency) has been accepted as a standard measure, is either a generally acceptable payment 
for goods and services or can be easily exchanged for a generally acceptable form of 
payment; three, e-gold can be used as a store of value. Although only time will tell its 
staying power, e-gold seems to have met all three criteria - at least for now (Dibbel 2002). 
Peer-to-Peer: Peer-to-peer money is where the so-called "e-mailable money," that is, 
paypal.com and comparable systems fit into the system of a peer-to-peer connection. 
Although a bit clunky and sometimes unreliable due to hacking and very simple technology, 
the use of it is fairly widespread. Importantly, this segment of money is unregulated, we 
really have no idea how much money is exchanged through these methods. 
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Analysis 
It appears to me that electronic forms of money are still very much in the process of 
evolution and definition. Many of the blanket assumptions of a medium's validity as money 
that one makes about other forms of money - either precious metals or paper currencies, 
cannot yet totally be made about electronic forms of money. I believe this is partially 
because Gresham's law is both operating fully to circulate and ultimately rid the system of 
the most dubious forms of electronic money. In the mid- to late-1990s a great deal of 
discussion had focused on non-state issued pre-paid payment systems - particularly for 
network-based systems. Analysts like Benjamin Cohen and Joel Kurtzman alternately 
lamented the impact these systems would have on monetary sovereignty, or lauded the 
possibilities it would have for economic expansion. These predictions were usually made in 
conjunction with predictions about the inevitability of the growth of e-commerce. 
Regardless of their personal views on the subject, most saw the advent and growth of stored-
value systems as inevitable. Their predictions were reinforced by the introduction of at least 
two major stored-value systems in 1999, near the height of the dotcom boom: flooz.com and 
beenz.com. Both currencies could be purchased by credit card and used at on-line retailers. 
They were treated more like "fun money" than real stores of value, but could be used at a 
number of on-line retailers, and could also be transmitted between individuals ( once 
purchased) via e-mail. However, by 2001 the "initial optimism [had] given way to large-
scale contraction" (Naraine 2001). Both flooz.com and beenz.com folded within a week of 
one another in August 2001. 
As one might imagine, this is a fast-growing, fast-changing field with major 
innovations or action happening within the space of months or years. It took the founders of 
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flooz.com, a network-based Stored Value System, less than half a dozen years to get from the 
initial planning stage, to a fairly wide implementation (in the range of some millions of 
dollars) of their product with the help of millions of dollars of venture capital money, 
ultimately to their declaration of Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2001 (Naraine 2001). Over the 
last decade, each year has seen the introduction and failure of many different media designed 
to allow consumers to make payments electronically - typically based around some sort of 
Stored Value System such as those referenced in Chapter Two. However, any proposed form 
of money must be judged by some criteria to make general and/or substantive predictions 
about which of the proposed systems might work. The basic criteria for these judgments 
were developed in the mid-nineties. (Indeed, much of the basic work and research in 
underlying protocols currently in existence was done between five and ten years ago.) 
What seems to have happened with both of the two companies is some sort of 
technological determinism. If there was going to be a new "virtual" economy, one needed to 
have "virtual" money as well. Therefore, various venture capital groups, poured enormous 
amounts of capital into start-up costs for the companies - over $80 million for beenz, and 
$50 million for flooz - like many other dotcom-era companies. However, I believe that many 
of those developing network-based stored value systems did not consider the multiple levels 
of what makes money. While flooz and beenz were both used as exchanges for goods, there 
was no real assurance of store of value. Neither company was required to have capital 
reserves like traditional banks, nor were they required to identify or authenticate their 
purchasers/account holders. This meant that when its users essentially "rushed" their 
deposits, neither company had any resources to back up the withdrawals. 
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Flooz was also the victim of huge amount of credit card fraud, which ultimately 
probably contributed to its failure. Some of the other currencies seem to also have been . 
affected by credit card fraud, but to a lesser degree. In addition, most of the companies' 
venture capital went into the development of electronic wallet technology. Rightly assuming 
that anti-counterfeiting measures would be important to a monetary system, the companies 
invested large amounts of money developing "counterfeit-proof systems." For what they 
were, they seem to have worked well. In fact, Verisign, one of the primary Internet security-
certificate granter, bases its technology on electronic wallet technology developed for another 
failed flooz and beenz competitor, digicash.com. However, in some ways they neglected to 
authenticate users by anything other than credit card - and for electronic purchases, simple 
ownership of account information is enough for use. 
However, to refer back to the initial e-cash proposal by Okamoto and Ohta, it appears 
that there is a missing point: in order to have a substantial advantage over traditional cash 
methods, transactions must be verifiable. Users of e-cash must be able to verify that the 
payments they make are appropriate and that payments they receive are what they are said to 
be. This quite possibly implies the need for authenticated usage. While this can be 
pseudonymous authentication, it means that verifiable e-cash cannot be completely 
anonymous. Another factor e-cash or Stored Value Systems must address is the difficulty of 
counterfeiting. In current cash systems, cash can be physically identified by its users fairly 
easily. For example, it is difficult to make a counterfeit copy of a twenty-dollar bill, without 
risking discovery by a normal informed consumer, although counterfeiting certainly does 
occur. However, there are also fairly straightforward ways of marking bills to check for 
authenticity - special ink markers in the United States, and special chip readers with the 
latest round of high-value Euro bills. 
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Thus, the real cost of making a high-quality paper counterfeit of high-demand bills -
typically considered U.S. dollars and Euros - is comparatively high to their real value. In 
addition, risk for loss stays with the holder of the money. In these cases, discovery would 
probably be relatively fast as consumers attempted to trace the path back to the original 
passer of the bill - perhaps only one or two steps - or more likely to notify of the particulars 
of the individual counterfeited bills. This assumes that in order to make any reasonable profit 
on the counterfeiting, a counterfeiter would need to pass multiple bills over a given period of 
time and geographical space. 
On the other hand, with the right computer and electronic equipment, the cost of 
making high quality - even exact copies - of e- money can be negligible. Depending on the 
knowledge of the system operating the e-cash system, the copies could be anywhere from 
relatively easy to very difficult to detect. If one would need multiple "secrets" to use the 
money, this difficulty might increase. However, with a public key type system, this would 
probably be difficult to ensure - particularly if the public key of the server/service was 
known. Then, one would only need one legitimate account to find out the normal service 
keys. 
Most proposed forms of e-cash are denominated in the units of exchange of the 
national currency. As such, it would be able to be used as a unit of exchange. Less certain 
will be thee-cash's ability to be used as a store of value. Most proposed e-money and e-cash 
protocols call for them to be primarily used as an instrument for small or micro-payments. 
When value is stored on off-line storage devices, the money could be much less robust than it 
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would be in an on-line, network-based system - this is not really due to problems in 
computers/computer terminals, but in the increasing likelihood that large databases will be 
backed up according to best-practice. A magnetic stripe or chip might then serve as an 
access device, but would typically store only information about accessing the card - not the 
money itself. Most likely there would also be correlating information about the account that 
would allow access to the account in the event of access-device failure. While the devices 
they are stored on are similar, the location of the money storage could make a difference in 
the ultimate stability/storage of value. However, this leads to the same problem as the early 
e-cash systems flooz and beenz. 
There are also a number of other difficulties associated with e-cash. Without 
authentication, Stored Value Systems gain very little, if any advantage over traditional cash-
based systems. However, not all people can offer legal authentication. Minors, for example, 
would have to have parental assistance to have a Stored Value card. This might preclude 
from the money system in ways they would not be before. 
Summary 
This chapter addresses proposed electronic cash and stored value systems of money. 
These types of money have been called the "future" of the money system and have been 
proposed as replacements for physical cash. I review one of the basic e-cash protocols and 
several possible applications for electronic cash. I also review some of the e-cash 
applications already tested in the monetary system. I eventually conclude that the social and 
technological impediments for e-cash are currently too substantial for widespread e-cash 
implementation in the near future. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusions 
As I outlined in the first chapter and detailed in the third chapter, the current 
monetary landscape is in a state of change with the growth of electronic monies and Stored 
Value Systems. These changes are due in large part to rapidly growing and changing 
information and communications technologies and to changes in the political landscape due 
to globalization. That changes are happening to the international monetary system is not a 
phenomenon unique to the last two decades. For example, neither national currencies nor 
debit cards existed in 1512. Money systems develop over time to fit the needs and 
preferences of their users: both individual users like Farmer Jones and Brutus the 
Swordsman, and Alice and Bob, as well as the governments and entities that coin and issue 
money. However, these preferences sometimes conflict with each other. See for example, 
the need for government coercion to introduce a national currency in the United States in the 
late 1800s. Money systems in place also match available technologies at the time. 
Generally, people trust the well-developed systems of electronic money in place that 
are connected with deposit-access techniques: like EFTs, credit and debit cards. People 
prefer systems of money when the currency a particular type of money is based on fulfills the 
basic functions of money: to serve as a store of value and a medium of exchange and 
account. All of the current monies that fulfill these functions are somehow connected with 
governmentally issued currencies. 10 Given the experiences of the developers offlooz, beenz, 
and other e-cashes, it appears that consumers are interested in currencies that fulfill more 
than one function of money and seem highly unlikely to adopt monies completely outside the 
10 This is with the possible exception of the Eurodollar. I am not convinced that the Eurodollar can be 
considered a genuine currency because it cannot be spent other than to buy other currencies. 
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domain of national currencies. The technologies developed for use in Stored Value Systems 
probably will not be useful other than for micropayments or payments in limited geographic 
regions. 
Many of the concerns expressed by Kobrin, Friedman, and King about the 
undermining influence of electronic money on centrals banks, particularly of e-cash and 
Stored Value Systems appear to be based on incomplete understandings of what the current 
technologies are really capable of. While they are correct to say that the monetary system is 
changing and that central banks will need to adapt to the changing environment, I remain 
unconvinced by Kobrin's argument that central banks' time is over. International institutions 
like the Bank for International Settlements and F ATF seem likely to increase in importance. 
In addition, the digital money system proposed by Warwick is interesting, but appears to be 
outside the range of what is technologically feasible right now. 
While it is difficult to make concrete predictions about what the composition of the 
monetary sector will look like fifty yearsJrom now, I foresee gradual evolutionary changes 
to that sector, rather than dramatic changes. Many of these changes will be related to 
governments and central banks ability to adapt to changes brought by information 
technologies and globalization. 
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